The weaknesses of the Stella Rossa were dramatically and irreversibly highlighted by the evolving and worsening situation at the front line. Among the structural elements a special focus has to be made on the top-down and centralizing style of Lupo that often frustrated and eventually pushed away those autonomous personalities (..) who had the capacity for command and decision making. Those would have been critically important in situations such as the combing-out operation on 29th September (...) when it would have been necessary to take decisions in the field rapidly and authoritatively. By coincidence, Lupo died at the very moment the operation began (....). Left to their own resources, Stella Rossa's men wavered and were divided about the decisions to take (....) They were not used to it; there were not any charismatic leaders able to impose control. The isolation of the brigade – both politically and militarily – was a direct result of the choices made by their leader, and on the incapacity to collect and evaluate information regarding the evolving military situation generally and specifically around Monte Sole itself.(..)
On the other side these elements could have remained as peculiarities of the brigade and its individual personalities.(.....) we have to stress that there was no reference points thast could have experience that could have prepared them [the Brigade) for the criminal modus operandi [of the Nazis) nor the tragic outcome. They knew the logic of reprisals and massacres but before they happened no on could have [predicted] such systematic brutality and violence. (..) No one could have possibly imagined such a massacre. People thought that to justify the killings it would have been necessary for the Nazis to establish a causal link and not just act because of the mere existence of a partisan brigade. (..)
Luca Baldissara, Paolo Pezzino, Il massacro. Guerra ai civili a Monte Sole, Il Mulino, 2009.